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Abstract:
This paper contributes to the growing literature on mean reversion in stock markets by
examining a newly constructed Danish data set for the period 1922-95. Variance ratio tests 
clearly reject the random walk hypothesis at the 2-year horizon, that is, the riskiness of a 2-
year investment is significantly less than twice the risk of a 1-year investment. Variance ratio
tests for 3- and 4-year horizons are not significant under conventional significance levels,
whereas autocorrelation tests of the joint hypothesis that there is departure from random walk
at all horizons tend to reject the random walk hypothesis and support the mean reversion
hypothesis.
*  This paper is a revised version of an earlier paper dated December 1997. Comments from participants at the
EPRU Workshop “The Stock Market & the Macroeconomy” and from participants at seminars at the Depart-
ment of Finance, Aarhus Business School and the Institute of Economics, Copenhagen Business School have
improved the paper. In particular, I thank Jan Olesen, Peter Sellin, Torsten Sloek and Karsten Tanggaard. Also
thanks to Christoffer Koch Sørensen and Ian Valsted for efficient research assistance.
21 The research underlying this paper was completed before markets started to fall.
The recent stock market decline may be seen as yet another observation that supports the main
thesis of this paper.
1. Introduction.
The purpose of this paper is to test whether the Danish stock market behaves like a random
walk vis-à-vis the hypothesis that the market has a tendency to mean revert. In order to
motivate this, let us consider the recent behaviour of the Danish market index. Like in so
many other countries, the market has been on an upward trend in recent years. Thus, the
(compounded) stock index went up by 6.3 per cent in 1995, by 30.5 per cent in 1996 and by
44.5 per cent in 1997. Altogether, that is more than a 80 per cent increase over three years and
that is in times with low inflation. However, according to the random walk hypothesis this
historical piece of evidence should not influence the forecast of  the next years index change,
that is, the expected change is independent of past movements. By contrast, the mean
reversion hypothesis asserts that the market after a number of good years is likely to exhibit
less exciting and perhaps even depressing returns depending of course on the exact form of
the mean reversion process.1
According to the random walk hypothesis, the change in the compounded stock index is
random, which is tantamount to saying that the 1-period returns are uncorrelated over time.
Due to that property, the variance of the k-period return is k times the variance of the 1-period
return, and it is this property that is applied in the variance ratio testing methodology due to
Cochrane (1988). By using this test or a closely related methodology, the random walk
hypothesis has been tested for a number of countries using long horizon returns, in most cases
1- to 10-year returns, see Fama and French (1988), Lo and MacKinlay (1988) and Poterba and
Summers (1988). The bottom line of these papers is that stock markets do not seem to behave
like a random walk. There is mild support for the mean reversion hypothesis over longer time
horizons; “mild” because it is not always posssible to get significant test results as noted by
Poterba and Summers, but that is hardly surprising given that a very substantial deviation
from the random walk hypothesis would be implausible because future returns would then be
highly predictable, using only the information in past returns.
3More recently, Kim, Nelson and Startz (1991) have argued that the mean reverting behaviour
in US stock prices reported in previous papers is mainly a pre World War II  phenomenon as
indicated also in Fama and French (1988), and is not particular relevant anymore. Campbell,
Lo and MacKinlay (1997) conclude their survey chapter by arguing that upon a closer
examination of the literature there is little evidence for mean reversion in long horizon returns
which, however, may be a symptom of small sample sizes rather than conclusive evidence
against mean reversion. Their conclusion is influenced by the work of Richardson and Stock
(1989) who show that the traditional variance ratio tests may be misleading when the return
horizon divided by the sample period is not a small number. Due to that criticism this paper
only reports the results for 2, 3 and 4 year returns and not for longer horizon returns as it was
common earlier.
This paper contributes to this growing literature by examining the Danish stock  returns since
World War I using a newly constructed dataset, see Nielsen and Risager (1998). To set the
scene, section 2 briefly outlines the random walk hypothesis and the variance ratio methodolo-
gy. Section 3 presents the test results. Section 4 adds complimentary material by examining
autocorrelation properties of the returns. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2.  Random Walk and Variance Ratio Test.
The compounded return denoted Xt+k of a k-year investment in the market portfolio of stocks
at time t is given by (1), where the Rs are the simple 1-year returns consisting of a dividend
yield and a capital gain component. Under the assumption that the log of one plus the annual
returns equal a constant µ plus a White Noise random term , as shown by (2), it is straightfor-
ward to show that the log of the k-period return (henceforth just the k-period return) denoted
xt+k equals k times the expected annual return plus the k innovation terms, see (3). Moreover, 
the k-period return follows a random walk with drift µ, see (4).
Xt+k = (1+Rt)(1+Rt+1)......(1+Rt+k) (1)
ln(1+Rt) = µ+,t,   E(,t)=0, cov(,t,,s)=0   t…s (2)
  =F2  t=s
4VR(k) '
Var(xt%k)/k
Var(xt)
'1 under random walk
<1 under mean reversion
>1 under mean aversion
(6)
xt+k = kµ+,t+...+,t+k (3)
xt+k = µ+xt+k-1+,t+k (4)
By using  (3) it can be shown that the expected k-period return is k times the annual mean
return, whereas the variance is k times the annual variance, see (5). 
E(xt+k) = kµ,   Var(xt+k) = kF
2 (5)
The variance ratio methodology tests the hypothesis that the variance of multiperiod returns
increases linearly with time. The variance of the k-year return to the variance of the 1-year
return divided by k is unity under the random walk. The variance ratio is significantly below
one under mean reversion, and above one under mean aversion, see (6).
3. Variance Ratio Tests. 
Having sketched the theory we now proceed to test the random walk hypothesis. The sample
{x}T t=0 runs from 1922(t=0) to 1995(t=T), that is, we have 74 (T+1) yearly returns. The
variance estimator is developed by Cochrane (1988) and is based on overlapping multyyear
returns, see footnote 1 in Table 1. This estimator corrects for small sample bias, that is, the
problem that the variance of the k-year return goes to zero as k approaches T. The variance
ratios can, however, be biased when the return horizon is large relative to the sample period,
see Richardson and Stock (1989) who develop an alternative statistical approach. Following
the alternative approach in Richardson and Stock (1989), the expected variance ratio equals
 even under the random walk null hypothesis, where * is the return horizon relative to(1&*)2
the sample period. Thus for *=2/74, 3/74, 4/74, the expected variance ratio is 0.95, 0.92, 0.90,
respectively. For a 10-year horizon the expected variance ratio equals 0.75 and hence is far
from unity. This concern explains why we only report tests for 2, 3 and 4-year horizons. 
5Figure 1: 1-Year Real Stock Return in Denmark, 1922-97
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Prior to reporting the results it is useful to look at the annual stock returns, which afteral
provide the basis for the tests, see Figure 1. It is interesting to observe that the process seems
to be characterized by negative serial correlation, which means that good years tend to be
followed by bad years, and vice versa. This phenomenon seems to be particularly strong
towards the end of the sample. Thus, the very high return in 1972 is followed by a poor return
in 1973 and particular in 1974. Following the poor 1974 we have a high return in 1975, which
immediately is followed by several bad years. There is a strong recovery in the beginning of
the 1980s, and 1983 is the year with the highest return recorded so far in the Danish stock
market history, but this year is immediately followed by a very bad  1984, which again is
followed by a bullish 1985. This tendency for the market to jump up and down continues
throughout the sample period and is of course an important motivator for formally testing the
mean reversion hypothesis.
The first row in Table 1 gives the variances at different investment horizons. The variance of
the 1-year real return equals 3.21 per cent, the variance of the 2-year return equals 4.65 and so
forth. Obviously, the variances do not increase linearly with time. The variance ratios are
reported in line 2, and they are all below unity. The third row presents the test statistic, which
is  asymptotically standard normal distributed and the corresponding prob-values are given in
6line 4. At the 2-year horizon there is a clear rejection of the random walk, that is, we can reject
the hypothesis at the 5 per cent level. We also reject at the 3-year horizon, whereas results are
less clear at the 4-year horizon. 
Table 1: Variance Ratio Tests for Danish Real Stock Returns, 1922-95
                                                 Investment Horizon (years)
1 2 3 4
1)Variance ( )2ˆ kσ 3.21 4.65 6.41 7.99
Variance Ratio








2
2ˆ
k
k
k
σ
σ
- 0.72 0.66 0.62
2)Variance Ratio Test - -2.36 -1.92 -1.73
                Prob Value - 0.02 0.05 0.08
3)Variance Ratio Test
under Heteroscedasticity - -1.99 -1.56 -1.39
                 Prob Value - 0.05 0.12 0.16
Notes: 1) ( )( ) ( )∑ 
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7So far it has been assumed that the distribution of the returns is constant over time, but Figure
1 indicates that the variability of the 1-year returns seems to have changed, that is, there is
evidence of increasing volatility towards the end of the sample. This motivates tests that allow
for heteroscedasticity. We follow the approach taken in Lo and MacKinlay (1988). Tests that
allow for general forms of heteroscedasticity are given in line 5. It now becomes more
difficult to reject the random walk hypothesis. However, there is still rejection at the 2-year
horizon using the conventional 5 per cent significance level. The result that the 2-year
variance is significantly less than twice the 1-year variance is tantamount to saying that there
is significant negative first order serial correlation, which is something we shall return to.
The variance ratio tests for the nominal returns are reported in Table 2. Again, there is a
tendency to mean reversion, but the results are not statistically significant. The stronger mean
reversion in real returns than in nominal returns is likely to reflect slow adjustment to inflation
shocks. Thus, in the short term stock returns do not provide a perfect inflation hedge, whereas
stocks are a much better hedge in the longer term, see also the recent study by Olesen (1998)
using the same data for Denmark. A sudden increase (fall) in inflation is therefore followed by
a drop (rise) in the real return in the short term and subsequently by an an increase (decline) to
the level that normally applies. That is in accordance with the mean reversion hypothesis.
8Table 2: Variance Ratio Tests for Danish Nominal Stock Returns, 1922-95
                                                 Investment Horizon (Years)
1 2 3 4
1)Variance ( )2ˆ kσ 3.19 4.79 6.85 8.56
Variance Ratio








2
2
ˆ
ˆ
k
k
k
σ
σ
- 0.75 0.72 0.67
2)Variance Ratio Test - -2.12 -1.63 -1.50
                Prob Value - 0.04 0.11 0.14
3)Variance Ratio Test
under Heteroscedasticity - -1.83 -1.34 -1.21
                 Prob Value - 0.07 0.18 0.23
Notes: 1) see note 1) to Table 1
2) see note 2) to Table 1
3) see note 3) to Table 1
Kim, Nelson and Startz (1991) found that the tendency to mean reversion in the US is entirely
due to the pre World War II period, which implies that the hypothesis is of little relevance
today. We examine this issue by only using the sample 1946-95. Line 6 in Table 3 presents the
test statistics also corrected for heteroscedasticity. The results for the 2-year horizon show that
we can only reject the random walk at the 10 per cent level. At first glance this finding seems
to weaken the mean reversion hypothesis, but the results from simple correlation tests stand in
sharp contrast to the outcome of variance ratio tests, cf. below. Moreover, it should also be
noted that it is harder to get statistical significant results in small samples as can be seen by
inspecting the test statistic, and we suspect that the small sample plays a role for the result.
9Table 3: Variance Ratio Tests for Danish Yearly Data, 1946-95
                                              Investment Horizon (Years)
1 2 3 4
1)Variance ( )2ˆ kσ 4.03 5.87 7.85 9.57
Variance Ratio








2
2
ˆ
ˆ
k
k
k
σ
σ
- 0.73 0.65 0.59
2)Variance Ratio Test - -1.90 -1.65 -1.52
                Prob Value - 0.066 0.102 0.126
3)Variance Ratio Test
under Heteroscedasticity - -1.69 -1.40 -1.28
                 Prob Value - 0.096 0.150 0.179
Notes: 1) see note 1) to Table 1
2) see note 2) to Table 1 
3) see note 3) to Table 1
4. Autocorrelation Tests.
The above results rejected the random walk at the 2-year horizon. The results were less clear
at longer horizons. Due to this mixture of findings it is desirable to test the joint hypothesis
that there is departure from random walk at all horizons. This is accomplished by the Ljung-
Box autocorrelation test designed for small samples. The null hypothesis is that all autocorre-
lation coefficients are zero, whereas the alternative is departure from zero autocorrelation at
all lags. Note that to apply the Ljung-Box test we do not need to assume normality of returns.
We have looked at the serial correlation pattern when there are 12, 10, 8, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1  lags.
The results show that we reject the random walk in about two third of the cases, see Table 4.
10
2In the AR(10) case we end up with an equation with negative serial correlation at lag
1 that is offset by positive serial correlation at lag 10.
Table 4: Autocorrelation Tests of 1-Year Real Returns1)
LB-Test With 74 Observations
12 25.05128**
10 23.77147**
8 14.15947*
6 7.193352
5 6.880049
4 6.758254
3 6.459494*
2 6.39740**
1 6.33033**
1)Ljung-Box statistic =     , where N is sample, D(k) is autocorrelation 
( )∑
−
+
=
m
k kN
k
NN
1
2 )(
2
ρ
  of lag k. ** means significant at the 5% level, i.e. rejection of the Random Walk.
 * means significant at the 10% level.
Further insight can be obtained by estimating AR-processes. We begin by estimating an
AR(12) for the whole sample period. The process is subsequently simplified by throwing the
variable out that is least significant according to the t-statistic; the model is then reestimated
and the variable that is least significant is then omitted and so forth. To apply the t-test, the
residual has to be normal and that is why we include dummies for 1972 and for 1983, which
are highly unusual in the Danish market history, see Figure 1 and Nielsen and Risager (1998).
Next, we estimate an AR(10) and gradually simplify until there are only significant variables
in the equation. By repeating this procedure also for AR(8), AR(6), AR(4), AR(2) we arrive at
the result that in all cases, except the AR(10) case, there is significant negative first order
serial correlation, see (7) below.2 That result is of course in line with the variance ratio
rejection at the 2-year horizon. The interpretation is that news to the market often gives rise to
overshooting, which afterwards is corrected by the market. 
11
ln(1 + R)t = 0.047 - 0.275ln(1 + R)t-1 + 0.55D72 + 0.68D83 (7)
                  (0.017)  (0.093)                  (0.14)         (0.14)
Sample 1923-95, R2 = 0.41, Normality CHI2(2) = 2.955
As mentioned earlier, there is apparently much less mean reversion after World War II in the
US. When the AR(12) is estimated only for the period 1946-95, we end up with much
stronger negative serial correlation in the Danish case (not shown - to save space). However,
12 lags are quite demanding and we have therefore estimated AR(6) processes for 1928-55,
28-65, 28-75, 28-85, 28-95. It turns out that the strong negative serial correlation is a
phenomenon that is statistically significant in particular from the 1970s and onwards.
Moreover, the parsimonius specification since the mid 1970s is an AR(1) with significant
negative serial correlation. Table 5 reports the parsimonious equations.
Table 5: Parsimonious Real Return Equations From AR(6) Processes
Sample Most significant explanatory variables
1928-55
1928-65
1928-75
1928-85
1928-95
- 0.227ln(1+R)t-4
   (1.32)
- 0.159ln(1+R)t-4
   (1.07)
- 0.362ln(1+R)t-2 + 0.264ln(1+R)t-3
   (3.23)        (2.42)
- 0.227ln(1+R)t-1
(2.39)
- 0.265ln(1+R)t-1
  (2.85)
Note: The AR(6) process is sequentially simplified by elimimating the insigninficant
variables. We only report those variables that are nearly significant (in case
none, we report the model which we end up with). Constant and dummy
variables are not reported. T-statistics are in brackets.
12
3The variance ratio statistics are, however, not so significant for the post War period
as for the whole sample period. We suspect that this is due to the short sample period.
5. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the growing literature on mean reversion in stock markets by
examining a newly constructed Danish data set for the period 1922-95. The variance ratio
tests show statistically significant mean reversion at the second year of the investment
horizon, that is, the riskiness of a 2-year investment is significantly less than twice the risk of
a 1-year investment. Hence, at the 2-year horizon the random walk hypothesis is clearly
rejected. Results for 3- and 4-year horizons are in line with mean reverting behaviour, but they
are not statistically significant under conventional significance levels. Whether this is
evidence against mean reversion and support for the random walk hypothesis or  just a
reflection of a small sample size is something we cannot tell. However, it should be noted that
simple autocorrelation tests of the joint hypothesis that there are departures from random walk
at all horizons reject the random walk hypothesis in the majority of cases. 
Moreover, in contrast to previous results for the US, the strong negative first order serial
correlation in real returns does not hinge on pre-World War II data as it apparently does in the
US, see Kim, Nelson and Startz (1991).  On the contrary, the serial correlation tests show that
mean reversion in the Danish stock market is a stronger phenomenon in modern times3. One
possible interpretation of the negative serial correlation in the data is that market overreacts to
news, that is, following the first dramatic reaction to a shock, the market falls back to normal.
This view is consistent with the permanent/transitory components model, which basically says
that stock markets are driven by a fundamental component that reflects the efficient market
price and behaves like a random walk, whereas there is also a temporary component that
captures deviations from efficiency and this component reverts to something that is close to
zero in the long term.
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